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JUSTICE IS THE CRIME. By Lewis R. Katz, Lawrence B. Litwin, and
Richard H. Bamberger. 1 Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Re-
serve University, 1972. Pp. 386. $6.95.
Important, incisive, yet disturbingly insular, Justice Is the Crime de-
cries congestion in the courts as the cynosure of a system's collision
with disaster. The criminal justice system, manacled with procedures
designed for yesteryear and crippled by interminable delay, is said to
be simply incapable of dispensing justice. As courts choke on felony
dockets, judges aspire at best for the mere appearance of justice; they
cannot restructure a system which holds them captive.2
In a detailed factual exploration of a system which serves neither
the interests of society nor those of the accused, Katz, Litwin, and Bam-
berger point out that the criminal law is "the dumping ground for all
of society's problems."3  The caseload caused by overcriminalization
results in intolerable demands on the resources of criminal courts. To
prosecute all felons is impossible, so criminal laws are unequally en-
forced. Whether a particular offender is arrested is determined by the
police, ordinarily according to the officer's perception of the interests
of the police department; the arrest is later justified by the officer in
court by whatever distortion of the facts may be necessary.4 After be-
1. Katz, a professor of law at Case Western Reserve Law School, has written some
of the better pieces on the administration of justice. E.g., Katz, Gideon's Trumpet:
Mournful and Muffled, 55 IowA L. REv. 523 (1970); Katz, Municipal Courts-Another
Urban ill, 20 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 87 (1968). Litwin and Bamberger are former
students of Katz.
2. The authors quote a judge who is disenchanted with the necessity of accepting
plea-bargains: "'I feel like a fool and a clerk in a bargain basement ...helping in
the denigration of our brilliant judicial heritage." L. KATZ, L. LITWIN & R. BAM-
EEROER, JusnicE Is TE Cm 219 (1972) [hereinafter cited as JusTicu Is Tu CRMMI].
3. Id. at 4. It is further explained:
The laws of the states and federal governments, moreover, are replete with too
many criminal offenses. Each time a new social problem arises that angers
the majority, legislatures are all too willing to enact additional criminal of-
fenses. . . . The decision to label marijuana users as criminals forced the po-
lice and the courts into the center of the generation gap ....
Id. at 90-91 (footnotes omitted).
4. "Distortion of the facts becomes the most persuasive and the most significant
of abuses." Id. at 96 n.25. See People v. Dickerson, 273 Cal. App. 2d 645, 650 n.4,
78 Cal. Rptr. 400, 403 n.4 (1969). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504-
05 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 172 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 36 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1970)
(Friendly, J., dissenting), rev'd, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971) (en bane), rev'd, 407
U.S. 143 (1972).
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ing arrested for what might appear to be a single offense, a man may
later be unfairly charged with additional felony counts, further congest-
ing court calendars.
Although presumed innocent, many arrested persons are incarcerated
because they are financially unable to post the bail imposed by the
court. An individual in jail can hardly assist in the preparation of his
defense. But whether an accused is able, for example, to help counsel
locate witnesses is of slight consequence; the courts accord the cherished
right of trial by jury to less than one defendant in ten.5 Indeed, the
caseload is so staggering that "the very survival of the criminal justice
system requires that the overwhelming majority of defendants do not
have trials." Defendants who desire jury trials are dissuaded by
threats of harsh sentences.7 Guilty pleas lead to most convictions; this
is said to be because "plea bargaining is necessary to the operation of
the system." s When a person pleads guilty he is sentenced according
to whatever whims inspired the bargain; the needs of the community
are ignored, judicial guidelines are conspicuous by their absence, and
the touchstone is "quantity, not quality."" In short, the system is a
shambles.
In the face of this distressing exposition, the primary thesis of Justice
Is the Crime is somewhat bizarre. As promulgated by Katz, Litwin,
and Bamberger, "The problem in the system is the inordinate amount
of time that elapses between the time an arrest occurs and final disposi-
tion is made of the case."'1 Though they recognize the need to restrict
the operation of the criminal law to truly criminal behavior, thus redu-
cing the astronomical number of cases which crush the courts," the au-
5. JuSTIcE Is TE CRIM 183, 190; accord, e.g., R. CLARK, CRIME iN AMERICA 196,
207 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CLARK].
6. JUSTICE Is THE CmRn 183. Moreover, "the system demands for its preservation
that all but a small fraction of cases result in pleas of guilty or in dismissal. It has
a compelling interest in reducing this fraction still further and in ensuring that proc-
esses for disposing of cases without trial are equitable." Id. at 191.
7. But see United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 966 (1973) (reflecting on the impropriety of District Judge Carr's use of his sen-
tencing power as a carrot to clear his congested calendar).
8. JUsTICE Is Tim CRmm 202. "Dealing is the essence of the criminal process
." Id. at 148.
9. Id. at 209.
10. Id. at 2.
11. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. As a result of the legislative tend.
ency to attempt to resolve all social problems through criminal sanctions, "criminal
courts throughout the country have more cases than can be intelligently handled, and
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thors assert that "legislatures that tackle the morass in the courts will
find that delay is the greatest problem ...."12 This curious conclu-
sion is apparently supported by nothing more than scholarly fiat. There
is no doubt, of course, that inordinate delay permeates the judicial proc-
ess. And though others may assess delay as, for example, a product
of gross overcriminalization,' 3 the fact that Katz, Litwin, and Bamber-
these cases move slowly through the maze of legal procedures towards disposition."
JUSTICE IS THE CRIME 4. Courts lack the ability to deal effectively with the myriad
of social problems; with the insufficient number of "legal personnel to cope with the
existing high crime rate, the additional role of social arbiter makes decisions about allo-
cating the available resources even more difficult." Id. at 92. Resource-alloication de-
cisions are made ithout reason and foster "the chaos that exists in the criminal justice
process." Id. More succinctly, "in order to make the law more meaningful to the
existing society, the wisdom of the legislature should be directed towards reviewing all
offenses and repealing many now outmoded laws." Id. at 102. Clogging the courts
with marginal offenses ensures "that the more serious crimes . . . will not get the scru-
tiny they deserve." Id. at 105.
12. JUSTICE IS THE CRIME 5 (emphasis added).
13. Fortifying their thesis by reference to an American Bar Association study,
criminologists Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins maintain:
The expenditure of police and criminal justice resources involved in attempt-
ing to enforce statutes in relation to sexual behavior, drug taking, gambling, and
other matters of private morality seriously depletes the time, energy, and man-
power available for dealing with the types of crime involving violence and
stealing which are the primary concern of the criminal justice system.
N. MoIs & G. HAwKINS, TnE HONEST PoLrrc AN's GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 6
(1970). This overreach of the criminal law, for example, with respect to public
drunkenness, "overloads the police, clogs the courts, and crowds the jails." Id.
Ramsey Clark assays that "the proliferation of the corpus of law, the failure to distill
and refine, to reduce to minimums, can hurl the system out of control." CLARK 202.
Specifically, and not surprisingly, "The evidence to date does not support criminal sanc-
tions against the use of marijuana." Id. at 95. Generally referring to "overreliance
on criminal justice to control antisocial conduct," id. at 116, Clark concludes that "ne-
glect and a demand that it do the impossible are the principal reasons our system of
criminal justice is failing." Id.
It was once opined by Thomas Jefferson that the Constitution tolerated congressional
legislation against "treason, counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United
States, piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the laws
of nations, and no other crimes whatever . . . ." Jefferson, The Kentucky Resolu-
tions of 1798, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONsTrTrION 540 (2d ed. J. Elliot 1861), reprinted in 4 THE
ANNALS OF AMERICA 62-63 (1968). But federal law today authorizes prosecution for
a "numerous series of offenses from a single alleged criminal transaction." Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 n.10 (1970). See J. MILL, ON LIMERTY (1859); E. SCHUR,
CRIMES WrroTr VicTIMs (1965); B. TARLow, SEARCH WAMANTS 82 n.214 (1973);
Morris, The Proper Role of the Criminal Law, in THE GREAT IDEAS TODAY 22 (1972);
cf. Will, Overloading the Judicial Circuit, 30 ANTIOCH REV. 235, 238-39 (1970). Com-
pare Junker, Criminalization and Criminogenesis, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 697 (1972), with
Kadish, More on Overcriminalization: A Reply to Professor Junker, 19 U.C.L.A.L.
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ger subscribe to the harebrained idea that delay itself is the cause of
court problems14 should not dismiss their thoughtful and provocative
analysis of delay. 5 Aside from its undiscerning central premise, Jus-
tice Is the Crime is a valuable, if not unimpeachable, work.
Surely, swift justice must be sought.' 6 At present, it is not unusual
that from a person's arrest to the disposition of his case some eight
months will elapse.' 7  By reasonable standards, the disposition should
be completed in less than three months;' 8 yet the median period appears
to be increasing. Katz, Litwin, and Bamberger painstakingly delineate
each factor which contributes to these inordinate time lapses, carefully
evaluate the utility of each component of the criminal justice procedure,
and set forth a rational reform for each time-absorbing step.
For persons released from custody after arrest, extended pretrial de-
lay is arguably beneficial. Not only may a released defendant help coun-
sel investigate and prepare for trial, but he may also earn the funds
necessary to retain counsel and, through employment and family activi-
ties, establish a pattern of good behavior which can help garner a lighter
sentence if he is convicted. Moreover, released defendants may await
the optimal plea-bargain, perhaps refusing one prosecutor's offer in
the hope of another's more lenient offer.'9 Some defendants may right-
REV. 719 (1972), and Skolnick, Criminalization and Criminogenesis: A Reply to Profes-
sor Junker, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 715 (1972).
14. At times, perspective is nearly attained. For example, sandwiched between as-
sertions that delay is the darkest evil is the recognition that "the great number of cases
makes delay inherent ....." JUSTICE IS THE CRIME 2.
15. Indeed, upon consideration of the system's existing inadequacies, it is not im-
probable that even with minimal criminalization the caseload would not be so insub-
stantial as to eradicate delay. Additionally, careful consideration should always be
given to any proposal which might hasten the administration of justice. See CLARK
119-23, 211.
16. In Robert Bolt's A Man For All Seasons, Sir Thomas More advises that a
prospective litigant will receive justice just as if she were Mores own daughter-fairly
"and quickly."
17. Katz, Litwin, and Bamberger concentrate on statistics compiled in Cuyahoga
County (Cleveland), Ohio, but supplement the figures with accounts from other jurisdic-
tions.
18. PRESIDENVS COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: Tun CouRTs 86-87 (1967), cited In JusncE Is THE CRIME
36 n.5.
19. To illustrate, suppose that one Sidney J. Freem is arrested in September 1969
and charged with possession of nine kilograms of marijuana. In November, at the time
of the pretrial conference, Freem is unemployed. The prosecutor offers a disposition
of a felony conviction and a maximum of one year in custody. The offer is refused
by defense counsel, who then proceeds to obtain continuances for the next ten months.
[Vol. 1973:956
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fully surmise that a sufficiently long delay will tend to facilitate the
disappearance of adverse witnesses. Thus, as the authors point out, per-
sons who are freed from custody "are in no hurry because delay works
to their benefit. ' 20  Further, "a mystique has developed among criminal
defense attorneys that if a defendant waits out the system long enough,
he may never be held accountable for his crimes.' In their wholesale
condemnation of pretrial delay, however, Katz, Litwin, and Bamberger
refuse to credit a right to delay on behalf of released defendants. The
authors argue that irrespective of bail status, a defendant must be proc-
essed quickly.2 2  For those accused held in jail pending adjudication,
the proposal appears valid; it is clear that for these persons the benefits
of delay are nonexistent. If denied release, a person must endure sub-
human jail conditions. 23  Family ties may be decimated. Job and in-
come are lost.2 4  A jailed defendant cannot assist in the preparation
of his defense, cannot properly confer with counsel,2 5 and is amenable
By the time the case comes up again, Freem has built an enviable record of good be-
havior, including employment in a respectable position for nine months. Moreover,
the head prosecutor is on vacation, and a new assistant handles the case. In these
circumstances, the prosecution agrees to a misdemeanor conviction with a sentence of
informal probation which allows Freem to continue in his job. Delay has clearly
inured to Freem's benefit and not only saved society the cost of incarceration but filled
its coffers with Freem's tax dollars. But under the scheme advanced by Katz, Litwin,
and Bamberger, Freem would have been jailed ab initio and would not have had the
opportunity to prove himself a valuable member of society.
20. JUSTICE IS THE CRIME 125 (footnote omitted).
21. Id. at 70.
22. "Strict overall time requirements, demanding disposition or trial within 60
days if the defendant is in jail or 120 days if he is free on bail, must be enacted to
cover the entire case and each separate stage of a case." Id. at 221. Part of the
rationale is that the perceived deterrence function of the criminal law requires that
"punishment must follow swiftly upon the wrongful act and the apprehension of the
wrongdoer." Id. at 53.
23. "[Plretrial detainees are jailed in far worse conditions than those convicted
of crimes." United States v. Cowper, 349 F. Supp. 560, 566 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (foot-
notes omitted). See Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 133-35 (N.D. Cal.
1972).
24. One advantage of pretrial release is that a person may earn the money neces-
sary to pay counsel. Katz, Litwin, and Bamberger recognize that many delays are oc-
casioned by counsel's need to be paid for his services, but they do not explain how
defense money is to be raised in the brief period allowed under their proposal.
25. In Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951), the Supreme Court said that the "tra-
ditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of
a defense." Justice Jackson explained that defendants confined pending trial "are
handicapped in consulting counsel, searching for evidence and witnesses, and preparing
a defense." Id. at 8 (concurring opinion). See Kinney v. Lenon, 425 F.2d 209 (9th
Cir. 1970). It has been reported that at least one judge ordered an accused released
965
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to constant pressures to plead guilty. Yet it is not unlikely that an
indigent's court-appointed counsel will delay the case without regard
to incarceration.
Few would suggest that a jailed defendant's right to a speedy trial2"
should not be scrupulously enforced. Katz, Litwin, and Bamberger
advocate a strict time parameter of sixty days; if charges against a per-
son in custody have not been disposed of, or if he has not at least
been brought to trial, within sixty days of his arrest, the charges must
be dismissed.2 7  With less persuasiveness, the authors recommend a
stringent 120-day limitation for cases in which the defendant has been
released on bail. To achieve this goal, Katz, Litwin, and Bamberger
suggest an unprecedented convolution of the sixth amendment's guaran-
tee of a speedy trial. Under the proposed system a defendant would
be compelled to exercise his right to a speedy trial; unlike other consti-
tutionally secured rights, the right to a speedy trial could not be
waived. 8 Perhaps alternatively, the enterprising authors would obtain
a constitutional amendment to provide what they describe as "the
community's speedy trial rights. '2 9  Anyone who has struggled under
the language of the sixth amendment knows that the right to be brought
to trial within a reasonable time is vested in the defendant and may
not, as yet, be exercised by the state.
Various other proposals detailed by the authors for streamlining the
criminal justice process appear to be sound and attainable. Even their
advocacy of abolition of the historic prosecutorial function of grand
juries ° in favor of a mandatory preliminary hearing should not meet
from custody so that he would be able to consult with his lawyer free from eavesdrop-
ping jailers. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 147, 149 (1962) (Warren, C.J.).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal proseeutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial ......
27. No dismissal would be in order if the defendant has somehow contributed
to the delay. See, e.g., People v. Ochoa, 9 Cal. App. 3d 500, 506-07, 88 Cal. Rptr.
399, 404 (1970); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1970).
28. JUSTICE Is THE CvIME 221: "The key to revitalizing the criminal justice system
and its ability to deliver a speedy trial must be standards that make a speedy trial
mandatory and that would deny to defendants and defense attorneys the opportunity
to choose delay as a tactic."
29. Id. at 173.
30. The grand jury is a mere rubber stamp for the prosecutor, fails to weed out
groundless charges, and is a far less effective screening device than the preliminary
hearing. Thus, when a defendant has been arrested and a preliminary hearing is con-
ducted, the grand jury serves no function and should be abolished. In an evaluation
of manifest prescience in light of Watergate, however, Katz, Litwin, and Bamberger
[Vol. 1973:956
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with violent disfavor outside an occasional prosecutor's office. But in
enumerating the means of implementing reform, Justice Is the Crime
at times strays beyond the pale. For example, not content to impose
near herculean burdens upon defense counsel to proceed expeditiously
with every case, Katz, Litwin, and Bamberger recommend that if an
attorney persists in efforts to maximize delay, "then a jail sentence may
be appropriate. '31  Similarly, under the new regime, if a released de-
fendant delays justice he "may be withdrawn from bail and incarcerated
. . ,"3 Furthermore, while initially disavowing so-called preventive
detention, the authors somehow manage to reverse their position, join-
ing John Mitchell and other erstwhile civil libertarians who favor this
vast incursion of fundamental rights.33
For defendants who are not to be preventively incarcerated prior to
trial, Katz, Litwin, and Bamberger advocate a more expeditious system
of setting bail. Instead of the present rote bail assessment by a magis-
trate at the initial court appearance, a comparable amount would be
fixed by the booking officer at the police station. Any accused unable
to secure release after forty-eight hours would receive judicial review
suggest that "the grand jury could continue to function, albeit on a much smaller scale,
investigating criminal activity where there has been no arrest and overseeing public
officials as a check against official misconduct." Id. at 135. Indeed, Jeb Magruder
testified in June 1973 before the Senate's "Watergate Committee" that his visions of
prison bars commenced when the grand jury announced it would reconvene for further
investigation.
31. Id. at 86. The authors intimate that continuances should be denied even to
the extreme of compelling a person "to defend without counsel." Id. at 85 (footnote
omitted).
32. Id. at 174.
33. See Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55
VA. L. REV. 1223 (1969). Katz, Litwin, and Baniberger point out quite correctly that
there has yet to be divined any adequate basis for predicting a person's future behavior
so as to justify pretrial incarceration. See Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive
Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371, 372-73 (1970). The au-
thors suggest, however, that if preventive detention reduces delay, "then the program
will have made a substantial contribution to society." JUsTIcE Is TH CnmsE 143. Jail-
ing people prior to an adjudication of guilt or innocence "may help to lessen the op-
pressive fear of crime that hangs so heavily over the American society and is inhib-
iting the life of American cities." Id. at 175.
It is unfortunate, but not inexplicable, that the authors manifest a Mitchell men-
tality and quote generously from police-state citadels like Richard Nixon and Warren
Burger. Precursing the book's doom is a notation on the copyright page that "Justice
Is the Crime was originally prepared as a report to the National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration."
When one is funded by the werewolf, the echo of its cry may be omnipresent and
inescapable.
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of the police bail-setting. Clearly, such a revised procedure would con-
serve court resources and allow immediate release of persons arrested
at untoward times such as Friday night. Nevertheless, if reform is
in the offing and the police are to be instrumental, it would seem more
appropriate to consider dismantling the extant arrest, jail, and bail pro-
gram in favor of a process in which an accused person may execute
a simple promise to appear.
The delay-causing bail process, as well as other historical procedures
which the authors probe, tends to maim rather than further contempo-
rary interests. If, as Katz, Litwin, and Bamberger maintain, the pres-
ent criminal justice system cannot adequately serve present needs, a rea-
sonable solution would be either the creation of a new system or a re-
duction in needs. Wholesale replacement of the existing system is un-
doubtedly precluded by the nation's traditions; time-saving steps articu-
lated in Justice Is the Crime at best would provide an expedited morass.
But a reduction in demands is theoretically viable. To return, for ex-
ample, to the uncodified criminal law would result in far fewer arrests
and would unclog court dockets to the extent that a concept like trial
by jury could mean more than some obscure alternative to a plea-bar-
gain. Concerned solely with the most important anti-social behavior,
courts could fulfill their function of dispensing justice.
Yet, because one must accept the improbability of a massive repeal
of useless laws, 34 Justice Is the Crime must be accorded the attention
of anyone seriously pursuing court reform. It is one of the most com-
prehensive and thoroughly documented works of its kind.8r Its recom-
34. Attorneys Mel Albaum and Walter H. King have issued a realistic and in-
spired, albeit whimsical, challenge to the horror-monger critics of court congestion:
Inefficiency in the administration of justice is a prerequisite for our survival
as a free nation. . . . "Free" meaning not incarcerated.
If the law were applied equally, efficiently and persistently by competent
police and prosecutors with adequate numbers of personnel properly equipped,
the great majority of our population would be behind bars. The rest, of
course, would be on probation.
Albaum & King, Legal Loops, L.A. Free Press, Aug. 20, 1971, at 15, col. 3. To the
degree that court congestion diverts police attention to serious crime and causes judges
to dismiss cases involving technical or moral offenses, "it serves a valid social func-
tion." Id. Moreover, when court traffic exceeds that of Kennedy International, de-
fense lawyers' coffers are lined. Thus, "our present system is perfect." Id.
35. In addition to massive citations of relevant authority in the footnotes, fustice
Is the Crime contains a thirteen-page bibliography, a twenty-page appendix of convinc-
ing court statistics, and a 119-page compilation of state criminal procedure statutes and
ease authority. The statute and case outline extends from Alabama to Wyoming and
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mendations for alleviating delay in the criminal court system are specific
and frequently susceptible of implementation. But, largely because
of its parochial focus on delay as the singular affliction of the judicial
process, Justice Is the Crime cannot be deemed to have realized the
full promise of its imaginative title.
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